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some of the most contested in the field of corporateand securities law, such
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INTRODUCTION

The acronym "ESG" is used as shorthand for a dizzyingly broad array of
"environmental," "social," and "governance" topics affecting businesses.
The topics spanned include climate change, human capital management,
supply chain management, human rights, cybersecurity, diversity and
inclusion, corporate tax policy, corporate political spending, executive
compensation practices, and more.' Members of the ESG movement are
similarly diverse, in both identity and motivation. They include financially
motivated investors and traditional asset managers who believe companies'
approach to (at least certain) ESG topics will bear on the companies' longterm performance, or the long-term performance of the investors' or asset
managers' broader investment portfolios.2 They also include values-based
investors who care about whether, and how, corporations address (at least
See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, CorporateLaw & Social Risk, 73 VAND. L.
1.
REV. 1401, 1414-15 (2020) (listing within "ESG's wide scope" issues related to privacy, climate change,
diversity, workplace relationships, including gender equality and diversity, technology problems like
privacy and cybersecurity, and supply chain challenges like humane work conditions, and observing that
"ESG's scope expands by the day with new concerns vying for corporate attention, like the use of sugar
in packaged foods or children and screen time"); INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK:
A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 50 (2020),

https://ww

w.ici.org/pdf/2020factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLZ5-ZN8Q] (observing that ESG "matters vary
widely, but are generally considered to include topics related to climate change, diversity and inclusion,
human rights, the rights of company shareholders, and companies' compensation structures").
Sometimes the equally broad terms "sustainability" and "non-financial disclosure" are used
synonymously to refer to this collection of topics.
2.
See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink's 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of

Finance, BLACKROCK (2020) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-finkceo-letter [https://perma.cc/S6JM-YKQW] (stating that BlackRock's "investment conviction is that
sustainability- and climate-integrated portfolios can provide better risk-adjusted returns to investors");
John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk (Eur. Corp.

Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 541, 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
3678197 [https://perma.cc/TD8Q-PWDP] (linking interest in ESG disclosure by managers of diversified
index funds to a desire to reduce systematic risk); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Stewardship (Columbia
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 640, 2021), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i
d=3782814 (arguing that index funds' approach to ESG matters can serve the interests of their investors
by reducing systematic risk).
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3
certain) ESG topics due to religious or sociopolitical commitments. The
ESG umbrella also shelters various non-investor corporate stakeholders and
third parties who care about whether, and how, corporations address (at least
certain) ESG topics because they are personally affected (e.g., employees
vis-a-vis labor practices) or due to religious or sociopolitical commitments
(e.g., environmentalists vis-a-vis environmental impact). 4 ESG proponents
also include members of an emerging corps of people and institutions who
profit from the movement, including corporate sustainability officers, 5
providers of ESG ratings and indices, 6 accounting firms that offer ESGrelated services, 7 and managers of specialized ESG-investment vehicles.8

3.

Of the 511 funds that the Investment Company Institute categorizes as investing according

to ESG criteria in its 2020 Fact Book ("ESG funds"), 141 (28%) fall within the "religious values focus"
subcategory. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 52. This subcategory represents $104.6 billion (33%)
of the $321.3 billion in total net assets managed by ESG funds identified by the Investment Company
Institute as of December 2019. Id.
The ESG movement in this regard is also contributing to the recently reinvigorated debate
4.
over corporate purpose. For an attempt to bring greater clarity to that debate, see Edward Rock, For
Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020: The Debate over Corporate Purpose (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 515, 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=

3589951 [https://perma.cc/F5ZF-7Q3U].
5.
See Kathleen Miller Perkins & George Serafeim, ChiefSustainabilityOfficers: Who Are They
and What Do They Do?, in LEADING SUSTAINABLE CHANGE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 196,
196-97 (Rebecca Henderson, Ranjay Gulati & Michael Tushman eds., 2015) (noting that "[o]ne recent
trend has been the increasing appointment of Chief Sustainability Officers (CSOs) to drive the
formulation and execution of an organization's sustainability strategy" and that the "number of CSOs
has grown substantially over the past few years").
See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
6.
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 387 (2020)
(observing that "[h]undreds of commercial ESG indices provide ESG ratings of individual companies");
Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index
Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1992 (2020) (observing that "[r]ising interest in ESG investing has
[] generated a huge market opportunity for the providers of ESG indices and metrics, who are []
capitalizing on this key moment").
For examples of ESG-related service offerings by the "Big Four" accounting firms, see ESG
7.
Reporting: It's Vital to How You Tell Your Company's Story, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, https://www
ESG
[https://perma.cc/CHV4-QEPX];
.pwc.com/us/en/services/audit-assurance/esg-reporting.html
Investor Relations Services, KPMG, https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/advisory/risk-consulting/i
[https://perma.cc/Q8YGntemal-audit-risk/sustainability-services/esg-investor-relations-services.html
EA25]; Climate Change and SustainabilityServices, ERNST & YOUNG, https://www.ey.com/engl/clim
ate-change-sustainability-services [https://perma.cc/6AZ5-D3QS]; Climate & Sustainability: Guiding
Organizationsto a More SustainableFuture, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/covid-1 9/
climate---sustainability.html/?icid=wn_climate---sustainability [https://perma.cc/ENR6-MF5V].
8.
According to Morningstar, the ESG/sustainable funds universe grew to 303 open-end and
exchange-traded funds in 2019, consisting of three broad types: "ESG Focus," "Impact/Thematic," and
"Sustainable Sector." See MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 2 (2020). At
the same time, the number of conventional funds that now say they "consider" ESG factors has grown

to 564 funds from 81 in 2018. See id. The 564 "ESG Consideration" funds had $933 billion in assets
under management at the end of 2019. See id. at 6. Using a different classification methodology, the
Investment Company Institute reports that, as of December 2019, there were 511 funds that invest
according to ESG criteria with a total of $321.3 billion in assets under management. See INV. CO. INST.,
supranote 1, at 52.
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Even the Business Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers
of leading U.S. corporations, seemingly embraced ESG in its 2019
Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation,9 though some suspect its
motivations have more to do with public relations or a desire to protect
executives from shareholder discipline than a true commitment to ESG. 10
The stated motivations of others involved in the movement can also be
questioned. Traditional asset managers claim their commitment to ESG is
motivated by a desire to improve long-term fund performance for the benefit
of investors." But agency costs offer an alternative potential explanation:
embracing the ESG movement may help asset managers curry political
favor, enabling them to fend off greater regulation of the industry;' 2 it may
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://syste
9.
m.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporati
on-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUT6-HRYL].
See, e.g., Council of InstitutionalInvestors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on
10.
CorporatePurpose, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/augl 9_brt_
response [https://perma.cc/48X9-PFZ8] (warning that "'stakeholder governance' and 'sustainability"'
may become "hiding places for poor management"); Editorial, The 'Stakeholder'CEOs, WALL ST. J.

(Aug. 19, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stakeholder-ceos-11566248641

(observing

that there is "more than a whiff of pre-emptive politics" in the Business Roundtable's statement and
warning that "[a]n ill-defined stakeholder model can quickly become a license for CEOs to waste capital
on projects that might make them local or political heroes but ill-serve those same stakeholders if the
business falters"); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REv. 91, 98 (2020) (arguing that the statement is "largely . . a rhetorical
public relations move, rather than the harbinger of meaningful change"); see also Elizabeth Demers,

Jurian Hendrikse, Philip Joos & Baruch Lev, ESG Didn't Immunize Stocks Against the COVID-19
Market Crash, but Investments in Intangible Assets Did, J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675920 [https://perma.cc/996E-XR5A] (noting that an
"alternative view on corporate ESG investments derives from agency theory," and explaining that this
"more skeptical perspective suggests that executives may choose to improve their compan[ies'] ESG
scores at the expense of shareholders in order to build their own personal reputations").

11.

See, e.g., Fink, supra note 2; Ron O'Hanley, Investor Focus on Sustainability Is About

ManagingRisk, STATE ST. (Feb. 2020), https://www.statestreet.com/ideas/articles/investor-focus-on-su
stainability-is-about-managing-risk.html [https://perma.cc/M89R-J2HG] ("Sustainable investing is
about value, not values .... ").
12.
The embrace of ESG by large asset managers has occurred during a time of increasing public
concern regarding the outsized power these managers have over the economy. See, e.g., David
McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund Takeover, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/thehidden-dangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover (observing that the biggest three asset managers,
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, are "potentially the most powerful force over a huge swath of
America Inc." and that "[a]larm bells have begun to go off with some regulators, as well as with an
ideologically diverse array of academics and activists"); Matt Egan, BlackRock and the $15 Trillion

FundIndustry Should Be Broken Up, Antimonopoly Group Says, CNN BUS. (Nov. 24, 2020, 1:25 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/24/business/blackrock-vanguard-state-street-biden/index.html [https://p
erma.cc/MKY8-75JM] (reporting that "[c]ritics say BlackRock (BLK), Vanguard and State Street (STT)
have become too powerful and that the Biden administration and Congress need to rein them in"); John
C. Coates, The Future of CorporateGovernance PartI: The Problem of Twelve 19-23 (Harv. L. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 19-07,2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3247337 [https:/
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advance the personal sociopolitical commitments of those who run them; 13
or it may offer a way to attract investors to fund offerings without imposing
any meaningful limitations on how a fund is managed.' 4
The breadth of topics embraced by ESG, and the breadth of motivations
spurring the ESG movement, has created a big tent that has undoubtedly
served a purpose in terms of helping the various causes of those involved to
gain momentum. But it has also created problems. For example, ESG
performance ratings are inconsistent and difficult to decipher. Which of the
myriad ESG issues are factored into a rating, how performance on those
issues is measured, and the weight each issue is given are subjective, usually
non-transparent determinations that vary across ratings providers.' 5 The
breadth of ESG topics also makes studies that purport to show a positive
link between ESG performance and financial performance difficult to
interpret. There is no a priori reason to believe that a company's approach
to climate change and a company's approach to diversity or any other ESG
issue will have the same sort of impact on a company's financial
performance; yet these studies often bundle ESG issues together to measure
ESG performance or rely on ESG performance ratings that themselves
bundle the issues together. They therefore leave unanswered which, if any,

/perma.cc/6EBR-WEPZ] (outlining various potential policy responses to the "legitimacy and
accountability challenge" posed by the concentration of power "in the hands of a dozen or fewer people"
at the largest asset managers).

13.

See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds 117-18, in

GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3525355 (observing that the heads of institutional intermediaries may
use their position to advance their personal policy preferences).
14.
See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 6, at 1992 (discussing the "[d]iverse supply side forces" that
"drive ESG asset growth and contribute to ESG market heterogeneity and opacity"); see also Michal
Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Weber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the
New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020) (arguing that index fund
managers' interest in ESG is motivated by a desire to court investment by socially-conscious millennials
rather than a concern for shareholder value); see also Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D. Mahoney, The New
Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG, COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript 15-18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3809914
(describing the agency costs in both public and private funds that may cause them to embrace ESG).
See, e.g., Rajna Gibson, Philipp Krueger & Peter Steffen Schmidt, ESG Rating Disagreement
15.
and Stock Returns 5-8 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 19-67, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p

apers.cfm?abstractid=3433728

[https://perma.cc/YG4W-Y4WQ]

(explaining

that, "[g]iven the

complexity of measuring a firm's non-financial or ESG performance, the validity of these ratings has
been debated critically" and providing an overview of the literature on ESG ratings divergence); see also
James Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
17, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-or-exxon-more-sustainable-it-depends-who
m-you-ask-1537199931 (explaining how the same company's ESG score can vary widely depending on
the methodology employed by the ESG rating provider and observing that ESG ratings "are no more
than a series of judgments by the scoring companies about what matters - and investors who blindly
follow their scores are buying into those opinions, mostly without even knowing what they are").
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discrete corporate policies related to ESG actually impact financial
performance. 16
Regulators have also pointed out problems with use of the term "ESG."
SEC officials have expressed concerns regarding its use in mutual fund
advertising, because its vagueness can leave fund investors with
misimpressions regarding what exactly they are buying into."7 Rule changes
may follow. 18 The Department of Labor (DOL) cited a lack of clarity
regarding the goals of ESG investment funds as a basis for a recent rule
16.
See Magali A. Delmas, Dror Etzion & Nicholas Nairn-Birch, Triangulating Environmental
Performance: What Do Corporate Social Responsibility Ratings Really Capture?, 27 ACAD. MGMT.
PERSPs. 255, 256 (2013) (observing that "while there appears to be agreement that environmental and
social performance is multidimensional and that the strength of the relationship between each dimension
and financial performance may vary, there is little consensus in the literature on what each dimension
represents and thus what corporate social responsibility ratings actually measure"); Jon Entine, The Myth
of Social Investing: A Critique of Its Practiceand Consequences for Corporate Social Rerformance
Research, 16 ORG. & ENV'T 352, 354-56 (2003) (critiquing a popular rating used by academic
researchers of corporate social performance (CSP) as "hopelessly flawed" and observing that
"[a]lthough there is general agreement that CSP is a multidimensional construct, there are no agreed-on
standards or theoretical rationale or way to aggregate and therefore compare multiple dimensions across
or within industries"); see also virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of

Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 419 (2018) (reviewing the empirical literature supporting the
materiality of ESG information and noting that the literature "shows that the financial materiality of
many specific ESG indicators varies by industry sector" and that "large-scale studies do not answer the
question of which ESG indicators are material to a particularfirm's investors") (emphasis added). Some
posit that corporations that embrace ESG activities can build social capital and trust, positioning the firm
to better weather periods of crises, see, e.g., Paul C. Godfrey, Craig B. Merrill & Jared M. Hansen, The
Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the
Risk Management Hypothesis, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 425 (2009), or that the engagement with
stakeholders that ESG activities promote may help surface risks leading to better risk management
practices, see, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 1. These claims are empirically contested, see, e.g.,
Demers, et al., supra note 10, and like more general assertions that ESG contributes to better firm
financial performance, they leave unanswered just which of the myriad activities that fall under the ESG
heading lead to the hypothesized effects.
17.
See Elad L. Roisman, Comm'r, SEC, Keynote Speech at the Society for Corporate
Governance National Conference (July 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-keynotesociety-corporate-governance-national-conference-2020 [https://perma.cc/A5YV-8ZL5]; Juliet Chung

& Dave Michaels, ESG Funds Draw SEC Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16,2019, 7:05 AM), https://www.
Pippa Stevens, 'Fooling Ourselves' to
wsj.com/articles/esg-funds-draw-sec-scrutiny-l1576492201;
Focus on 'Amorphous' Social Investing Factors, Says SEC Commissioner Peirce, CNBC (Dec. 17,

2019, 3:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/17/sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-calls-for-oversight
-of-esg-funds.html [https://perma.cc/3XEQ-2T7W]. Recent empirical work by Professors Dana
Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker substantiates these concerns. See Brakman Reiser & Tucker, supra note
6, at 1927 (concluding that "the ESG label acts more as a product signal and branding mechanism than
it does a promise of a specific investment strategy or avoided externalities"). See also SEC, Division of

Examinations, Risk Alert: The Division of Examinations Review of ESG Investing (April 9, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf (highlighting deficiencies and internal control weaknesses
identified during examinations of advisers and funds related to ESG investing).
18.
See, e.g., Request for Comments on Fund Names, 85 Fed. Reg. 13221, 13222-25 (March 6,
2020); see also Andrew Ramonas, Asset Managers Need More ESG Vote Transparency, SEC's Lee
Says, BLOOMBERG LAW (March 17, 2021) (reporting on then-acting SEC Chair Allison Lee's comment
that the SEC should update rules and guidance on disclosures related to asset managers' ESG voting
records).
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proposal that would have clarified that ERISA plan fiduciaries cannot offer
or invest in a fund if the fund's strategy allows it to prioritize non-economic
ESG benefits or risks at the expense of financial returns. 19 The proposed
rule was severely criticized by ESG proponents, who contended that it
would discourage ESG investing.2 0 The final rule, issued late last year,
continues to require that ERISA plan fiduciaries focus only on pecuniary
factors when making investment decisions, but removed any specific
references to "ESG." 2 In the preamble to the final rule, the DOL explained
that "'ESG' terminology, although used in common parlance when
discussing investments and investment strategies, is not a clear or helpful
lexicon for a regulatory standard." 2 2 The DOL found fault with the term in
part because "by conflating unrelated environmental, social, and corporate
governance factors into a single term, ESG invites a less than appropriately
rigorous analytical approach in evaluating whether any given E, S, or G
consideration presents a material business risk or opportunity to a company
that corporate officers and directors should manage as part of the company's
business plan and that qualified investment professionals would treat as
economic considerations in evaluating an investment in that company." 2 3
In this Article I address one manifestation of what we might call the
"ESG fuzziness problem." The SEC has recently come under pressure to
mandate ESG disclosures by public companies in their SEC filings, and a
recent House bill would require it to do so. 24 Although a large percentage of
public companies voluntarily disclose ESG-related information in standalone sustainability reports,25 they utilize divergent frameworks developed
by private standard-setters, and the disclosures may not be produced in the
same careful manner as disclosures in SEC filings. Proponents of an SECmandated ESG disclosure regime argue it would enhance investors' ability

See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113, 39114 (proposed
19.
June 30, 2020). The proposed rule also highlighted the documentation requirements an ERISA plan
fiduciary must comply with if they choose an ESG investment under the "all things being equal" test,
which allows ERISA fiduciaries to select an investment on non-pecuniary grounds if it is economically
indistinguishable from alternatives. For discussions of how ERISA affects ESG investing by fund
trustees, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supranote 6, at 404-11, and Coffee, supra note 2, at 22-34.
20.
See, e.g., John Sullivan, Dem Senators Oppose DOL 's ESG Investing Rule, 401K SPECIALIST
MAO. (July 16, 2020), https://401kspecialistmag.com/dem-senators-oppose-dols-esg-investing-rule/ [htt

ps://perma.cc/K79W-ZM4v].
21.

See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846 (Nov. 13. 2020)

(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2020)).
22. Id. at 72,857.
23.
Id.
24.

See infra Part 1.

25.

See generally KPMG, THE TIME HAS COME: THE KPMG SURVEY OF SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING 2020 (2020), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/11/the-time-has-come.pd
f [https://perma.cc/JH69-4747].

1828

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1821

to compare companies on ESG dimensions, combat the problem of selective
ESG disclosure (also known as "greenwashing"), and improve the quality
of ESG disclosures. 26 I offer no opinion as to whether the SEC ought to
mandate disclosure of information related to any particular ESG topic, or
whether it should-as recent proposals advocate-adopt a mandatory ESG
disclosure framework. My purpose, rather, is to illustrate how the breadth
and vagueness of the recent proposals obscure the important-and
controversial-policy questions that would need to be addressed before the
SEC could move forward on the proposals in a principled way. The
questions raised include some of the most contested in the field of corporate
and securities law, such as the value of interjurisdictional competition for
corporate charters, the right way to conceptualize the purpose of the
corporation, the proper allocation of managerial power as between the board
and shareholders, and the social desirability of fraud-on-the-market class
actions.
I. RECENT CALLS FOR SEC-MANDATED ESG DISCLOSURE
On April 15, 2016, the SEC issued a concept release seeking input on
whether the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K elicit the
information that investors need for investment and voting decisions, how
registrants can most effectively present the information, and the costs and
benefits of disclosure requirements for companies and investors.27 Some of
the questions that the SEC sought feedback on concerned "the importance
of sustainability and public policy matters to informed investment and
voting decisions." 2 8 The release explained that the Commission "has
determined in the past that disclosure relating to environmental and other
matters of social concern should not be required of all registrants unless
appropriate to further a specific congressional mandate or unless, under the
particular facts and circumstances, such matters are material." 29 It thus
asked that commentators provide "feedback on which, if any, sustainability
and public policy disclosures are important to an understanding of a
registrant's business and financial condition and whether there are other

See infra Part I.
26.
27.
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Solicits Public Comment on Business and Financial Disclosure
Requirements in Regulation S-K (April 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/201 6-70.html

[https://perma.cc/AAA7-WGTD]. This was part of a broader initiative by the SEC's Division of
Corporation Finance to review the disclosure requirements applicable to public companies.

28.
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,970
(Apr. 22, 2016).
29.
Id. (referencing Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (Nov. 6, 1975));
see also id. at 23,971-72 (discussing the SEC's past approach to social and environmental disclosure).
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considerations that make these disclosures important to investment and
voting decisions," as well as the "potential challenges and costs associated
with compiling and disclosing this information." 30 The Concept Release
elicited over 25,000 comments.3 1 According to one review, 348 of those
comments were unique while the rest were form comments solicited in
response to public interest campaigns run by Public Citizen and Americans
for Tax Fairness.32 Professor Harper Ho reports that "[t]he vast majority of
the public comments to the Concept Release focused to some extent and
often exclusively on ESG disclosure issues." 33 Many commentators
expressed support for ESG disclosure reform.34
On October 1, 2018, Professors Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch served
the SEC with a formal petition for rulemaking on ESG disclosure.35 The
petition, which was "signed by investors and associated organizations
representing more than $5 trillion in assets under management," argues that
the "response to the Concept Release strongly suggests that it is time for the
Commission to engage in a rulemaking process to develop a framework for
public reporting companies to use to disclose specific, much higher-quality
ESG information than is currently being produced pursuant either to
voluntary initiatives or current SEC requirements." 36 The petition does not
define what "ESG information" is, although it references specific examples
such as climate change, political spending, gender pay ratios, human rights,
and tax disclosure. 3 Nor does it claim that all such information is
financially material, instead citing studies that purportedly confirm "the
financial materiality of much ESG information." 38 Neither the petition nor
the underlying studies cited specify which subset of ESG information is
Id. at 23,970; see also id. at 23,971 (listing specific requests for comment).
30.
See SEC, Comments on Concept Release: Business and Financial Disclosure Required by
31.
Regulation S-K, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616.htm [https://perma.cc/4U38-Y39C].
TYLER GELLASCH, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY: A REVIEW OF COMMENTS TO THE
32.
SEC'S DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS CONCEPT RELEASE 15 (2016), https://www.ussif.org/Files/Public_
Policy/CommentLetters/SustainableEconomyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9ED-DVPU].

Virginia Harper Ho, DisclosureOverload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure& ESG Reformfrom
33.
the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 77 (2020).
34.
See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE 2016: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS 4 (2016), https://w
ww.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/state-of-disclosure-2016/ [https://perma.cc/87LN-MS5C] (reporting that
two-thirds of non-form comment letters received addressed sustainability-related concerns and that
eighty percent of those called for improved disclosure of sustainability-related information in SEC
filings). For an in-depth analysis of these comments, see Harper Ho, supra note 33.

35.

Request for Rulemaking from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch to Brent J. Fields, Sec'y,

SEC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FP-T

RBE].
36.

Id. at cover letter, 2.

37.
38.

See generally id.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

1830

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1821

financially material. The petition argues, however, that the level of interest
investors have expressed in ESG supports the conclusion that ESG
information is material. 39 Voluntary ESG disclosure is inadequate to meet
investor demands for this information, the petition explains, due to its poor
quality and variability, which prohibits comparability across companies.4 0
The petition therefore requests that the SEC "initiate rulemaking to develop
mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality, comparable,
decision-useful environmental, social, and governance information." 41 The
petition notes that a number of "promising" ESG disclosure frameworks
have already been developed by private standard setters, but does not
endorse any particular one.42
On May 21, 2020, the SEC Investment Advisory Committee (IAC)
similarly recommended that the SEC embark on an initiative to develop "an
ESG disclosure framework," explaining that the "message that we have
heard consistently is that investors consider certain ESG information
material" and that, "despite a plethora of data, there is a lack of material,
available." 4s The
[ESG]
information
consistent
comparable,
recommendation defines ESG "as a broad set of subjects germane to
businesses as highlighted by The Business Roundtable August 19, 2019 in
its Statement of Purpose: customers, employees, suppliers, the community
(environment), and shareholders." 4 4 Like the Williams & Fisch petition, the
recommendation points the SEC to existing ESG disclosure frameworks to
"help shape its thinking," but stops short of "recommending or endorsing
any particular standard."a 5
A bill titled the "ESG Disclosure Simplification Act" was reported out
of the House Financial Services Committee in January 2020,46 and after
reintroduction earlier this year passed in the House on June 16th by a one
vote margin.4 7 The bill would require public companies to provide in their
annual proxy statements a description of the company's views "about the
link between ESG metrics and the long-term business strategy" of the
company and any process the company "uses to determine the impact of
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 6-9.
at 10.
at 16.
at 12.

43.
Investor-as-Owner Subcomm., SEC Inv. Advisory Comm., Recommendation Relating to
ESG Disclosure 1--2 (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/
[https://perma.cc/T52
recommendation-of-the-investor-as-owner-subcommittee-on-esg-disclosure.pdf

Id. at 1 n.
Id. at 10.
ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. (2020).
ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2021, H.R. 1187, 117th Congress (2021).
.

H-666X].
44.
45.
46.
47.
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ESG metrics on the long-term business strategy." 4 8 The bill would also
require the SEC to require public companies "to disclose environmental,
social, and governance metrics" in any filing that requires audited financial
statements.4 9 The bill does not define "ESG metrics." Instead, it requires the
SEC to promulgate a definition through rulemaking. 50 The bill does state,
however, that "[i]t is the sense of Congress" that (as-yet undefined) ESG
metrics "are de facto material for purposes of disclosures under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933."'" The bill
also authorizes the SEC to, as it may deem appropriate, "incorporate any
internationally recognized, independent, multi-stakeholder environmental,
social, and governance disclosure standards" when it promulgates a
definition of ESG metrics.52 Like the Williams & Fisch petition and IAC
recommendation, the bill does not endorse any particular existing set of
ESG disclosure standards.
In the wake of recent Democratic electoral victories and the Senate's
confirmation of Gary Gensler to replace Jay Clayton as Chairman of the
SEC, we can expect the foregoing proposals to receive more serious
attention than they have previously. Indeed, under the interim leadership of
Commissioner Allison Lee pending Gensler's confirmation earlier this year,
the SEC created and staffed a new position titled "Senior Policy Advisor for
Climate and ESG."5 3 The Press Release announcing this move explained
that the new advisor will "advise the agency on [ESG] matters and advance
related new initiatives across [the SEC's] offices and divisions." 54 Acting
Chair Lee also requested public comment on climate change disclosure,
indicating that "[i]n addition to climate-related disclosure, the staff is
evaluating a range of disclosure issues under the heading of environmental,

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b)(l)(A).
Id. § 2(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 2(b)(3).

52.
Id. § 2(b)(4). The bill also calls for the creation of a permanent "Sustainable Finance
Advisory Committee" which would, inter alia, be tasked with recommending "policy changes to
facilitate the flow of capital towards sustainable investments, in particular environmentally sustainable
investments." Id. § 3. "Sustainable finance" is defined to mean "the provision of finance with respect to
investments taking into account environmental, social, and governance considerations." Id. Several other
bills have been introduced in the House and Senate related to ESG disclosure. "These bills include
disclosures on a variety of issues such as information regarding sexual harassment claims, financial and
business risks associated with climate change, and the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the
board of directors and executives." GAO, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 38 n.52 (2020), https://www.ga

o.gov/assets/710/707949.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R7T-ZZUS].
53.

Press Release, SEC, Satyam Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG

(Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-20 [https://perma.cc/7R7T-ZZUS].
54.
Id.
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social, and governance, or ESG, matters." 5 5 Among the questions that
comment is sought on are whether climate-related disclosures should be
"one component of a broader ESG disclosure framework" and how the SEC
should "craft climate-related disclosure requirements that would
complement a broader ESG disclosure standard.", 6 Professor John Coates,
the Acting Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, has also
expressed his view that "[t]he SEC should help lead the creation of an
effective ESG disclosure system," 5 7 and has indicated that the SEC is poised
to move "promptly" on ESG rulemaking in 2021.58

II. THE SEC'S TYPICAL APPROACH TO MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
If information were costless to produce and costless to process, a strong
case could be made for mandating full transparency on all issues related to
a reporting company's operations in its SEC filings, including the myriad
topics that fall under the ESG umbrella, subject to countervailing
competitive and privacy interests. In reality, of course, information is costly
to produce and costly to process. To disclose information, companies must
first collect it. This consumes resources that could otherwise be spent on the
company's core productive activities. The resources U.S. public companies
spend collecting and assuring the accuracy of information required to be
included in SEC filings is significant, not just because of the volume of
information that companies are required to disclose, but also because of the
unique liability risk that U.S. public companies face for inaccuracies in
those filings. Although the point can be overstated, it is also the case that
investors face cognitive limitations on their ability to process information,

55.
Allison Lee, Public Statement, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures
[https://p
(March 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures

erma.cc/HCC8-SB5Z].
56.
Id. In March the SEC also announced the creation of a 22-member "Climate and ESG Task
Force" in the Division of Enforcement. According to the Press Release, the Task Force, "[c]onsistent
with increasing investor focus and reliance on climate and ESG-related disclosure and investment, []
will develop initiatives to proactively identify ESG-related misconduct." Press Release, SEC, SEC
Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues (March 4, 2021), https://www.
sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 [https://perma.cc/3TCE-5NMB].
57.
John Coates, Public Statement, ESG Disclosure - Keeping Pace with Developments
Affecting Investors, Public Companies and the Capital Markets, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-state
[http
ment/coates-esg-disclosure-keeping-pace-0311217utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

s://perma.cc/AE9A-DDH5].
58.
Andrew Ramonas, SEC to Move 'Promptly'on ESG Rulemaking in 2021, Official Says,
BLOOMBERG.COM (April 30, 2021).
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meaning more information can sometimes detract from informed decision
making. 59
Because information is costly to produce and process, the SEC has never
required anything close to full disclosure in SEC filings. As a first cut, the
SEC typically limits disclosure to items that meet a materiality threshold.
The SEC defines material information as information that a "reasonable
investor" would be substantially likely to consider important in making an
investment decision. 60 Who should count as a "reasonable investor" for
purposes of this test is certainly debatable as a policy matter.6 ' But the SEC
has taken the view that a reasonable investor is a rational investor who cares
primarily about the financial performance of his or her investments. In
rejecting past pleas to expand disclosure obligations to encompass matters
primarily of social concern, the SEC has repeatedly emphasized its
commitment to a financial conception of materiality. 62 It is likely for this
reason that many of the recent proposals calling for SEC-mandated ESG
disclosure emphasize the ESG-financial performance link. 63 But not even
59.

See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1978) (observing that burying

shareholders "in an avalanche of trivial information... is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking"); see also Harper Ho, supra note 33, at 119 (noting that 96% of issuers who provided
comments on the SEC's Concept Release argued that ESG disclosure would overwhelm investors with
immaterial information, while 63% of investors who commented disagreed).
Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act provides that the term "material," when used to qualify a
60.
requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. The SEC adopted
this definition of materiality in 1982 so it would align with the Supreme Court's definition of materiality
in securities litigation; the SEC previously defined as material "those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security registered."

Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,925 (Apr. 22,
2016).
61.

See Amanda M. Rose, The "Reasonable Investor" of FederalSecurities Law: Insightsfrom

Tort Law's "Reasonable Person" & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. CORP. L. 77, 89-93, 110-13 (2017).
62.

See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial

Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1246-63 (1999) (recounting this history).
See Ann M. Lipton, Not EverythingIs About Investors: The Casefor MandatoryStakeholder
63.
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 554 (2020) (observing that "[b]ecause the SEC has taken the
position that 'materiality' refers to information that has economic significance, most appeals for new
rulemaking focus on the relevance of the requested information to corporate performance, regardless of
the advocate's true interest"). Some have described the shift toward the ESG lexicon as a "rebranding"
of the socially responsible investing movement of the 1970s and 1980s. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff,
supra note 6, at 388 (observing that "ESG investing finds its roots in the socially responsible investing
(SRI) movement" and that in the late 1990s and early 2000s "proponents of SRI rebranded the concept
as ESG by adding corporate governance factors (the G in ESG), and they asserted that ESG investing
could improve risk-adjusted returns"); see also Mariana Pargendler, The Rise ofInternational Corporate

Law, 98 WASH. U. L. REV 1764, 1795 (2021) ("Although socially responsible investing (especially
focused on divestitures) had a long history, the ESG framing helped eliminate the traditional separation
between socially responsible investment and mainstream investment."). In addition to addressing
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the most ardent ESG supporters would contend that all ESG information is
material, as the securities laws currently define that term. Corporations'
approach to certain ESG topics may impact their financial performance in a
material way, whereas their approach to other ESG topics may not.
Variations undoubtedly exist amongst industries and amongst companies
within industries.64 Without specifying the particular topic that disclosure is
sought on, it is impossible to assess whether the information is likely
material under traditional conceptions of that term.
Even with respect to material information, the SEC does not always
mandate disclosure. Information need not be disclosed unless there is a
specific duty to disclose it, or the information is both material and necessary
to make other statements made not misleading. The decision to create a duty
to disclose requires a weighing of, inter alia, the cost to companies of
producing the information and the magnitude of the benefit to investors of
the information's production (not all material information is of equal
importance). This requires a fact-specific, contextual analysis. For example,
if the information is readily accessible given existing information systems,
the cost of mandating disclosure will be less than if disclosure would require
companies to create entirely new information systems. The appropriate form
disclosure should take also necessitates a fact-specific, contextual analysis.
Some ESG topics may lend themselves to principles-based disclosure,
whereas others may warrant a more prescriptive form. There are wellrecognized tradeoffs between these two approaches, and those tradeoffs can
65
only be assessed and debated in a concrete setting.
challenges related to the SEC's conception of materiality, this rebranding made plausible arguments that
ESG investing is consistent with an ERISA trustee's fiduciary duties. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 25
(arguing that rebranding SRI as ESG "enabled law firms to opine to their clients that ESG investing was
fully compatible with the trustee's fiduciary obligations").

64.

As the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has explained, "[s]ustainability

issues are not material for all companies, and when they are material, they manifest in unique ways and
require industry-specific metrics." SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY REGULATION S-K: THE SEC'S CONCEPT RELEASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 3
[htt
(2016), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Reg-SK-Comment-Bulletin-091416.pdf
ps://perma.cc/Z3RJ-3UDB]. Through a consultation process that spanned several years, SASB
developed standards for over seventy industries that identify the subset of sustainability topics that are
likely to be financially material for a company in that industry as well as recommended metrics for
reporting on those topics; the standards recognize that whether a particular topic is in fact material is a
judgment that can only be made at the firm level. For a description of SASB's standard-setting process,
see Standard-Setting Process, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/standards
/process/ [https://perma.cc/S75M-KRDT].
65.
As the SEC recounted in the Concept Release:
Limiting prescriptive disclosure requirements and emphasizing principles-based disclosure
could improve disclosure by reducing the amount of information that may be irrelevant,
outdated or immaterial. Because prescriptive disclosure requirements may result in disclosure
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Specificity is also required in order to assess whether a new mandatory
disclosure obligation is necessary to elicit the information sought. Public
companies are already required to disclose information on a variety of
"ESG" topics. Extensive disclosures are required in annual proxy statements
related to executive compensation and governance practices, for example. 66
Pursuant to Congressional mandate, the SEC has also required companies
to disclose information related to mine safety and the use of conflict
minerals.67 In addition, in 2010 the SEC issued guidance instructing that
Items 101, 103, 303, and 503(c) of Regulation S-K can sometimes require
disclosure of risks and costs posed by climate change, environmental
regulation, and environmental litigation. 68 In 2011, it issued guidance
explaining that information related to cybersecurity risks and breaches may
need to be disclosed under these same provisions; that guidance also
that is not necessarily material or important to investors, greater use of principles-based
disclosure requirements may allow registrants to more effectively tailor their disclosure to
provide only the information about their specific business and financial condition that is
important to investors. A principles-based approach also may allow registrants to readily adapt
their disclosure to facts and circumstances that may change over time.
On the other hand, reducing prescriptive disclosure requirements and shifting towards more
principles-based disclosure requirements may limit the comparability, consistency and
completeness of disclosure. Also, in the absence of clear guidelines for determining when
information is material, registrants may have difficulty applying principles-based disclosure
requirements, and the disclosure provided may not give investors sufficient insight into how
registrants apply different principles-based disclosure thresholds. Potentially important
information that may be disclosed in response to a prescriptive disclosure requirement might
not be included in response to a principles-based disclosure requirement....

Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,927 (Apr. 22,
2016) (footnotes omitted). The SEC also described a third "objectives-oriented" approach that the SEC
staff had proposed in a prior study for developing new accounting standards. "Under this approach,
standard setters would develop new rules by clearly articulating the accounting objective of the standard
and providing sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be applied on a consistent basis."

Jd.
66.
See ELIZABETH A. ISING, KRISTA P. HANVEY, GEOFFREY E. WALTER, HEATHER MARSHALL
& BRIAN MYERS, DONNELLEY FIN. SOLS., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SEC'S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULES (2020), https://www.
dfinsolutions.com/insights/guide/executive-compensation-disclosure-handbook [https://perma.cc/H4L7

-NPXT].
67.

See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Mine Safety Disclosure Requirements

(Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-273.htm [https://perma.cc/KAQ5-HD2R];
Fatima Alali & Sophia I-Ling Wang, Conflict Minerals Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities, CPA J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajoumal.com
/2018/07/18/conflict-minerals-disclosure-requirements-and-corporate-social-responsibility/ [https://per
ma.cc/ZK24-FV2W]. "Conflict minerals" are defined as those originating in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo or an adjoining country. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p). It was "the sense of Congress that the
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals . . . is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme
levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and genderbased violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein." Dodd-Frank Wall

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
68.

Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6289

(Feb. 8, 2010).
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explains how cybersecurity-related information may impact disclosures in
a company's financial statements and in its discussion of the effectiveness
of disclosure controls and procedures required by Item 307 of Regulation
S-K. 69 The SEC revisited and augmented its cybersecurity guidance in
2018, noting that Item 407(h) of Regulation S-K and Item 7 of Schedule
14A can also create disclosure obligations concerning cybersecurity. 70
The general disclosure obligations cited in the SEC's climate change and
cybersecurity guidance may also, depending on the facts and circumstances,
call for disclosures related to a variety of other topics that fall under the ESG
umbrella. For example, Item 105 of Regulation S-K requires a registrant to
provide, under the heading "Risk Factors," a discussion of the material
factors that make an investment in the registrant speculative or risky; Item
303 of Regulation S-K (Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, also known as the
"MD&A"), requires issuers, inter alia, to identify and disclose known
trends, events, demands, commitments, and uncertainties that are
reasonably likely to have a material effect on financial condition or
operating performance; and Item 407(h) of Regulation S-K and Item 7 of
Schedule 14A require a company to disclose the extent of its board's role in
the risk oversight of the company, such as how the board administers its
oversight function and the effect this has on the board's leadership
structure.7' With respect to the latter, the SEC has instructed that "disclosure
about the board's involvement in the oversight of the risk management
process should provide important information to investors about how a
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing the
company," as well as a description of how the board administers its risk
oversight function.7 2
If reasonable investors believe these obligations are failing to elicit
sufficient disclosure on a particular ESG topic, the logical first question they
should ask is why? Depending on the nature of the problem, the appropriate
policy response may differ. Perhaps beefed-up surveillance of the topic as
part of the SEC's ongoing disclosure review program is in order.73 Perhaps
69.

CFDisclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2- Cybersecurity, SEC (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec

.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm
70.

[https://perma.cc/578N-XRV3].

Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83

Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018).
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.105, 229.303, 229.407, 240.14a-101.
71.
72.
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68333, 68345 (Dec. 23, 2009).
While serving as Acting Chair, Commissioner Lee recently directed the SEC's Division of
73.
Corporation Finance to enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company filings. See
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additional interpretative guidance is called for, or perhaps a more
prescriptive line-item disclosure obligation ought to be created. These are
difficult questions that cannot be intelligently discussed in the abstract.
Petitions that the SEC mandate disclosure of specific ESG topics, or
provide interpretive guidance related thereto, have been introduced in the
past, with mixed success. The climate change guidance mentioned above
was adopted after a coalition of investors and environmental non-profits
requested formal guidance in petitions filed with the Commission in 2007,
2008, and 2009.74 Petitions calling for mandated disclosure of, inter alia,
gender pay ratios 75 and corporate political spending 76 have not, by contrast,
prompted SEC action to date.77 The SEC's response to a recent petition
seeking greater disclosure on human capital management illustrates well the
difficult questions a decision to mandate disclosure on a specific ESG topic
will necessarily raise.
On July 6, 2017, the Human Capital Management Coalition (HCMC),
comprised of institutional investors with roughly $3 trillion in assets, filed
a petition seeking enhanced human capital management disclosure; 78 the
IAC followed suit with a recommendation that the SEC recognize the
significance of human capital management to investors and incorporate
Public Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Acting SEC Chair, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related
Disclosure (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-r
elated-disclosure [https://perma.cc/HCZ8-MWWG].
74.
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.

6289, 6291 n.20 (Feb. 8, 2010).
See Letter from Sallie Krawcheck & Joseph F. Keefe, Chair and Chief Exec. Officer, Pax
75.
Ellevate, to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2016/petn4-

696.pdf [https://perma.ccfTJH2-A79J].
76.
See Letter from Comm. on Disclosure of Corp. Pol. Spending, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec'y, SEC (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf [https://perma.cc/9

LQV-MZ8L].
A December 2020 policy rider to an appropriations law currently prevents the SEC from
77.
issuing disclosure mandates related to political spending, but a bill introduced in the House in January
would repeal that roadblock if enacted into law. See Transparency in Corporate Political Spending Act,
H.R. 403, 117th Cong. (2021). At his confirmation hearing, Chairman Gensler expressed his view that the
SEC should consider mandating disclosure on political spending (Zachary Warmbrodt, Gensler: SEC
Should Consider Corporate Political Spending Disclosures, POLITICO (March 2, 2021, 2:07 PM),

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/02/gensler-sec-corporate-political-spending-472607),

and the

Acting Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance is a long-time advocate for such

disclosure (see, e.g., John C. Coates & Taylor Lincoln, Opinion, Fulfilling the Promise of 'Citizens
United', WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fulfilling-the-promise
-of-citizens-united/2011 /09/02/glQAa4np7J_story.html).
See Letter from Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., to William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC
78.
(July 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF5P-TDW
C]. The petition generated a substantial number of comments supporting increased disclosure of human
capital management policies and specific human capital metrics. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition

to Require Issuersto Disclose Information About Their Human CapitalManagement Policies, Practices
and Performance, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-7 11/4-71

S].

.htm [https://perma.cc/A68J-VBV
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enhanced disclosures as part of its overall efforts to modernize corporate
reporting and disclosure.7 9 In August 2019, the SEC proposed amendments
to Items 101, 103, and 105 of Regulation S-K. 80 In recognition of the fact
that human capital has grown in importance as a resource and driver of
performance for certain companies since the time Regulation S-K was first
adopted, the SEC included among the proposed changes to Item 101
(description of business) a new obligation requiring "[a] description of the
registrant's human capital resources, including in such description any
human capital measures or objectives that management focuses on in
managing the business." 81 The proposed amendment provided as examples,
"depending on the nature of the registrant's business and workforce,
measures or objectives that address the attraction, development, and
retention of personnel."8 2
Notably, the proposed rule called for purely principles-based disclosure
and was cabined with a materiality qualifier. By contrast, the HCMC
petition had favored coupling principles-based disclosure with obligations
to disclose a wide array of specific workforce-related information,

including:
(1) Workforce demographics (number of full-time and part-time
workers, number of contingent workers, policies on and use of
subcontracting and outsourcing); (2) Workforce stability (turnover
(voluntary and involuntary), internal hire rate); (3) Workforce
composition (diversity, pay equity policies/audits/ratios); (4)
Workforce skills and capabilities (training, alignment with business
strategy, skills gaps); (5) Workforce culture and empowerment
(employee engagement, union representation, work-life initiatives);
(6) Workforce health and safety (work-related injuries and fatalities,
lost day rate); (7) Workforce productivity (return on cost of
workforce, profit/revenue per full-time employee); (8) Human rights
commitments and their implementation (principles used to evaluate
risk, constituency consultation processes, supplier due diligence);
[and] (9) Workforce compensation and incentives (bonus metrics
used for employees below the named executive officer level,
79.
See SEC, Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee, Human Capital
Management Disclosure(Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee2012/human-capital-disclosure-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/A82U-3YYB]. Many comment
letters submitted in response to the SEC's April 15, 2016, Concept Release on Regulation S-K also
expressed desires for improved disclosures related to human capital management. See supra note 31.

80.
2019) (to
81.
82.

Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358 (Aug. 23,
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239 & 240).
Id. at 44,370, 44,388.
Id.
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measures to counterbalance risks created by incentives).83
The petition argued that prescriptively requiring this information would
make it easier for investors to extract through an automated process and
would promote consistency and comparability. 84
In defense of its principles-based approach, the SEC explained that:
In assessing the best way to approach disclosure regarding human
capital, we were mindful that each industry, and even each company
within a specific industry, has its own human capital considerations,
and that those considerations may evolve over time. In light of this
fact, and with the principle of materiality in mind, it is our view that
prescribing fixed, specific line item disclosures in this area for all
registrants would not resu lt in the most meaningful disclosure. 85
Instead, the SEC concluded "that investors would be better served by
understanding how each company looks at its human capital and, in
particular, where management focuses its attention in this space." 8 6
The public comments the proposed rule elicited raised numerous
issues.87 Some commentators argued there was no need for any new
disclosure obligations related to human capital, due to sufficient voluntary
disclosure and/or existing disclosure obligations under Items 105 and 303
that would be triggered if the topic presented a material risk to the
company. 88 Some highlighted the costs associated with compliance,
including the potential need to disclose competitively sensitive
information. 89 Others supported the principles-based nature of the rule but
saw no need for calling out specific examples of measures or objectives
90
companies might report, while still others wanted additional examples.
Many commentators expressed the need for more prescriptive requirements
along the lines suggested by HCMC. 9 1 Some favored the issuance of
interpretative guidance rather than rule change. 9 2 On August 26, 2020, the

83.
omitted).

84.
85.
86.
87.

Letter from Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., supranote 78, at 26-27 (punctuation altered) (footnote

Id. at 27.
Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. at 44,370.
Id.
See generally Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Max Bradley, Securities Disclosure: Human Capital

Management Disclosure, 33 INSIGHTS 24 (2019) (describing the proposed rule and summarizing the
comments received).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

at 26-27.
at 27.
at 27-29.
at 27-28.
at 28.
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SEC adopted the proposed rule substantially as proposed, with Democratic
Commissioners Lee and Caroline Crenshaw dissenting. 93
III. ISSUES RAISED BY CALLS FOR AN SEC-MANDATED ESG DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORK

The recent proposals described in Part I do not request that the SEC
mandate disclosure on any specific ESG topic, and thus do not purport to
provide answers to the series of difficult questions a more targeted request
would trigger: Is the topic financially material? To all companies, or just
some? Why is sufficient information on the topic not being produced
pursuant to existing disclosure obligations? Is rulemaking the best fix? What
form should a new rule take and, relatedly, what is the associated cost?
Instead, the proposals invite the SEC to adopt a comprehensive ESG
disclosure framework. Requesting that the SEC adopt a framework for
companies to use to disclose information on a broad set of topics, without
establishing that any one of those topics is in fact financially material, is an
unusual foray into SEC rulemaking. The most compelling justification for
grouping ESG topics in this way, rather than treating each ESG issue
discretely-like any other business practice or risk that may (or may not)
warrant mandatory disclosure-is that the topics are already grouped
together under existing ESG reporting frameworks created by private
standard setters.
These existing frameworks, however, were not-with one exceptiondesigned with the SEC's disclosure regime in mind. The most popular
framework, cited as an exemplar the SEC might look to in both the Williams
& Fisch petition and the IAC recommendation, was developed by the nonprofit Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The "modular, interrelated GRI
Standards are designed primarily to be used as a set, to prepare a
sustainability report focused on material topics," 94 with a "material topic"
defined as a topic "that reflects a reporting organization's significant
economic, environmental and social impacts; or that substantively
influences the assessments and decisions of stakeholders." 95 The
93.
See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726 (Oct. 8,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239 & 240). For an academic critique of the form the final
rule took, see George S. Georgiev, The Human CapitalManagement Movement in U.S. CorporateLaw,

95 TULANE L. REV. 639, 713-723 (2021).
How to Use the GRI Standards, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/how-to-use-the-gri-st
94.
andards/gri-standards-english-language/ [https://perma.cc/J9JU-CXXQ].
GRI, GRI STANDARDS GLOSSARY 14 (2020). Stakeholders are defined as "entit[ies] or
95.
individual[s] that can reasonably be expected to be significantly affected by the reporting organization's
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Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) is a non-profit standard
setter that has uniquely developed a set of industry-specific sustainability
standards tethered (at least for now) to the SEC's definition of materiality. 96
Neither the Williams & Fisch petition nor the IAC recommendation nor the
House Bill endorse the SASB standards over the GRI standards, however,
suggesting that the proponents behind these proposals are not especially
concerned about financial materiality. 97 In a subsequent paper, Professor
Fisch candidly admits that the link between ESG performance and firm
performance is highly contested, arguing that enhanced ESG disclosure is
nevertheless appropriate because it will help investors determine whether
sustainability practices materially impact firm performance. 98 The House
Bill is clear about its willingness to have the SEC adopt an ESG disclosure
activities, products and services," including "those who are invested in the organization (such as
employees and shareholders), as well as those who have other relationships to the organization (such as
other workers who are not employees, suppliers, vulnerable groups, local communities, and NGOs or
other civil society organizations, among others)." Id. at 20.
See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 9 (2017), h
96.
ttps://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SASB_Conceptual-Framework_WATERMARK.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQ83-KRD9] ("In identifying sustainability topics that are reasonably likely to have
material impacts, the SASB applies the definition of 'materiality' established under the U.S. securities
laws."); see also SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 64. SASB is in the process of
revising its definition of materiality "to more effectively communicate the global nature of the concept
of financial materiality ... [and] to align as much as reasonably possible with the definition of
'materiality' used by the standard setters and other organizations who, like SASB, have a focus on the
information needs of the providers of capital." SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED
CHANGES TO THE SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & RULES OF PROCEDURE 7 (2020), https://www.wl
rk.com/docs/SASB_ ProposedChanges.pdf. Specifically, the proposed revision states that information
"is financially material if omitting, misstating, or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence
investment or lending decisions that users make on the basis of their assessments of short-, medium-,
and long-term financial performance and enterprise value." Id. Commentators have argued that SASB's
proposed incorporation of time horizons into its materiality definition represents a "deliberate step"
toward the concept of "dynamic materiality," which "is viewed in Europe as a far more 'forward-looking
and proactive' approach than the traditional U.S. definition" of materiality. David A. Katz & Laura A.
McIntosh, 'Materiality'in America andAbroad, HARV. L. SCH. FRM. CORP. GOVN. (May 1, 2021), https
://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/0 1/corporate-govemance-update-materiality-in-america-and-abroa
d/ [https://perma.cc/7ECC-APEX] (explaining that the concept of "dynamic materiality" originated with
a 2020 white paper by the World Economic Forum and describes a process whereby "[w]hat is
financially immaterial to a company or industry today can become material tomorrow").
A preference for prescriptive, mandatory ESG disclosures may also help explain this.
97.
SASB's standards offer guidance to companies in assessing their existing disclosure obligations under
Regulation S-K, specifically as it relates to their MD&A. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD,
supra note 96, at I ("SASB standards are designed for voluntary use in disclosures required by existing
U.S. regulation in filings with the [SEC], such as Forms 10-K and 20-F."). SASB's standards describe
industry-specific sustainability topics that may present known trends and uncertainties reasonably likely
to materially affect financial condition or operating performance and offer metrics for reporting on those
topics. Id. at 9. SASB leaves it to companies to make the call whether a particular sustainability topic is
in fact material, id., and it has taken the position that additional line-item ESG disclosures are not
appropriate, see SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 64, at 3.

98.
(2019).

Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 925-26
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framework that extends beyond traditional notions of financial
materiality-it expressly permits the SEC to "incorporate any
internationally recognized, independent, multi-stakeholder environmental,
social, and governance disclosure standards" when it promulgates a
definition of ESG metrics, declaring such metrics to be "de facto
material." 99
If the SEC were to codify, perhaps with tweaks and modifications, an
existing ESG-disclosure framework that has been developed by private
standard-setters without strict regard for traditional securities-law
conceptions of what counts as material, what would be the implications?
Proponents argue that a large number of companies are already collecting
and disclosing ESG information and publishing it in sustainability reports,
and that requiring the information to be standardized and placed in SEC
filings would promote the consistency, comparability, and credibility of
those disclosures.100 This would, to the extent the ESG information is
financially material, be helpful to "reasonable" investors, as that term is
currently understood, even if some of the information produced would be
important only to values-based investors or other stakeholders. These
arguments are not without weight, but such a request raises significant
questions.
Most obviously, what will it cost to achieve the envisioned benefits to
users of ESG information? An SEC-mandated ESG disclosure regime
would impose new information-gathering and reporting obligations on
companies that today do not prepare sustainability reports pursuant to
whatever framework the SEC were to adopt. Even companies that do
currently utilize that framework when preparing sustainability reports
would bear additional costs, because the process for preparing SEC filings
is much more rigorous and involved. 101
Deeper, more philosophical questions lurk as well. For example,
questions of institutional competence and democratic accountability loom
large. When the SEC mandates disclosure of information because of its
demonstrable importance to companies' financial performance, it clearly
acts within the scope of both its expertise and authority. Asking the SEC to
choose an ESG disclosure framework based in part on considerations that

99.
(2019).
100.

See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(3)-4)

See supra Part I.
101. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 959 (observing that "[p]rivate organizations such as GRI and
SASB have identified dozens of disclosure items, and current sustainability reports commonly exceed
one hundred pages in length," and noting that the "cost of developing and complying with comparable
mandatory disclosure requirements would place a heavy burden on issuers").
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extend into the realm of politics thrusts the SEC into a less familiar and
more controversial role. Is the SEC the right institution to do this? 0 2
Questions of institutional competence and democratic accountability are
particularly significant because advocates for ESG disclosure clearly see it
as a mechanism for promoting certain types of corporate behavior and
discouraging others. 103 Mandating that such disclosures appear in SEC
filings would amplify this effect by involving the board and executives who
certify SEC filings in the ESG disclosure process. Advocates view this as a
benefit of SEC-mandated ESG disclosure.' 4 As is often pointed out, this
would not be first time the SEC has adopted a position that appears to be at
SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. raised this concern in response to pressure in the midsocial disclosures. See A. A. Sommer Jr., Comm'r,
SEC, Address at the Practising Law Institute: The Slippery Slope of Materiality (Dec. 8, 1975), https://w
(warning that
[https://perma.cc/89YR-WX36]
ww.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/120875sommer.pdf
"overloading [the concept of materiality], unduly burdening it, excessively expanding it, may result in
significant changes in the role of the Commission, the role of other enforcement agencies, and our ability
to carry out our statutory duties"). SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce echoed the concern in a speech
responding to calls for greater ESG disclosure last year. See Public Statement, Hester M. Peirce,
Comm'r, SEC, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize and Enhance Financial Disclosures
102.

1970s to expand the concept of materiality to capture

(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-mda-2020-01-30

[https://perma.cc/

&

LPJ5-MM7T] ("Securities regulators of this generation must not grow weak-kneed in defending the
concept of materiality, which continues to play a central role in ensuring the vibrancy of our capital
markets. We ought not step outside our lane and take on the role of environmental regulator or social
engineer."); see also Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 14, at 2-3 (arguing that the SEC "has neither the
expertise nor the political accountability to pursue climate, diversity, and other public policy goals" and
warning that if the SEC adopts an ESG disclosure regime it risks "eroding public trust in its capacity
and willingness to serve as an apolitical technocratic regulator of the capital markets"); cf Yoon-Ho
Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2016) (arguing that "the concept
of agency core mission, as such, should no longer have a prominent role in critically evaluating agency
regulations or Congress's regulatory assignments").
103. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 63, at 532 (asserting that "[t]he goal, in short, is to make
sustainability information relevant to financial performance, even if it is not currently, by empowering
noninvestor groups to pressure corporations into improving their behavior" and that, "[f]ar from
pursuing investor wealth, much of the sustainability movement is designed to make corporate profits
difficult to achieve unless management attends to the needs of noninvestor stakeholders"); Mahoney
Mahoney, supra note 14, at 8-12 (arguing that the goal of ESG proponents is to change firm behavior
in socially motivated directions); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Non-FinancialReporting & Corporate
Governance: Explaining American Divergence & Its Implications for Disclosure Reform, 10 ACCT.,
ECON., & L. 1, 12 (2020) (observing that "disclosure is widely recognized as a soft form of regulation,
incentivizing changes in corporate behavior where direct regulation may be difficult to achieve or
enforce").
104. See, e.g., Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking
SustainabilityMainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 669 (2019) (warning that "as long as sustainability
disclosure remains separate from required disclosure, changes in corporate conduct will be few and
slow"); Fisch, supra note 98, at 962 (explaining that SEC-mandated sustainability disclosures "will lead
to the board of directors being accountable for sustainability disclosures in a way in that they are not in
the current system" and that the "board's role in overseeing and certifying the sustainability disclosures
will require that they set up reporting systems" which, in turn "will both improve the reliability of the
disclosures and provide the board with a greater role in overseeing and understanding the issuer's
sustainability practices," enabling it "to incorporate sustainability considerations into its analysis of
strategic issues and operational risk management").
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least in part motivated by a desire to affect corporate behavior. 105 Its
position on the qualitative materiality of information related to management
integrity (including managers' involvement in illegal activity) is one
commonly cited example.1 06 But when the SEC has gone down this path in
the past it has sparked considerable controversy, because using disclosure
rules to influence corporate behavior operates to blur the line between the
domains of federal securities regulation and state corporate law.1 07 Critics
contend that federalizing aspects of corporate governance inhibits the ability
of states to compete for corporate charters, thus undermining the "genius"
of American corporate law. 108
Moreover, when the SEC has done this in the past, the behavioral
changes sought have been at least ostensibly compatible with underlying
principles of state corporate law. For example, it is a breach of fiduciary
duty under Delaware corporate law for directors and officers to knowingly

105. See Request for Rulemaking from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, supra note 35, at 7;
see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraudas Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 vAND. L. REv. 859 (2003) (exploring how federal securities law and enforcement
via securities fraud class actions plays an important role in regulating corporate governance); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the

JOBSAct, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 373 (2013) (surveying "where we think the securities law responsibilities
of public companies have motivations and explanations not strictly confined to their contributions to
investor protection or capital formation").
106. See Williams, supra note 62, at 1265-66.
107. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 63, at 549 (explaining that the SEC's treatment of issues related
to management integrity as qualitatively material "kicked off years of controversy, with detractors
arguing that the SEC was using securities disclosure to shape corporate behavior in a manner that went
beyond investor and market protection, and champions defending the practice for the same reason" and
citing contributions to the debate) (footnotes omitted); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware 's Competition,
117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 635 (2003) (explaining that "[a]bsent a constitutional bar to federal involvement
in corporate affairs, the federal government can determine, has determined, and will determine many
critical elements of corporate governance" at the expense of historical state control).
108. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). For an overview
of the arguments for and against charter competition, see Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From
U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in InternationalSecurities Regulation, 39 GA. L.

REV. 525, 536-39 (2005). See also Hester Peirce, SEC, Public Statement, Rethinking Global ESG

&

Metrics (April 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/rethinking-global-esg-metrics [ht
tps://perma.cc/Q945-QDJZ] (warning that common ESG disclosure metrics "will drive and homogenize
capital allocation decisions" with detrimental effects on society); Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail
Christian Lenz, Mandatory CSR and Sustainability Reporting: Economic Analysis and Literature
Review, 3, 58-70 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 623, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.c
om/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427748 (observing that new disclosure mandates are popular because
viewed as less intrusive and more politically expedient than traditional regulation, but warning that
mandatory disclosure regimes can have negative unintended consequences and outlining the potential
effects on firm behavior of mandatory ESG disclosure mandates); Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 14,
at 23-24 (warning that SEC-mandated ESG disclosure may harm retail investors by reducing incentives
for current public companies to remain public and for privately-held business to go public).
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cause the company to violate positive law. 109 The behavior sought to be
promoted by ESG disclosure, by contrast, conflicts with Delaware corporate
law to the extent it promotes the prioritization of non-shareholder
constituencies in corporate decision-making.110 Even if the behavior sought
can be defended as promoting "long-term" shareholder interests,"' ESG
topics veer far deeper into matters of traditional business judgment than the
SEC has ever waded before.
Of course, those who support SEC-mandated ESG disclosure may not be
ardent supporters of shareholder primacy. And they may even support the
complete federalization of corporate law. Thus, these observations may not
change their views. That is not my intent. Rather, it is to focus attention on
the fact that broad calls for SEC-mandated ESG disclosure raise some of the
most contested questions in the field of corporate law, such as the value of
interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters," 2 the right way to
conceptualize the purpose of the corporation," 3 and the proper allocation of
14
managerial power as between the board and shareholders.'
The ESG disclosure mandates that have been imposed on listed
companies in the EU since 2018'' are explicitly tied to the EU's substantive
109. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013,
2019-21 (2019) (discussing jurisprudence holding that directors and officers who act with intent to
violate positive law breach their duty of good faith).
110. This is, at least, the predominant view. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444-51 (2001) (describing this as the "consensus"
view); cf Rock, supra note 4 (noting the reinvigorated debate over corporate purpose). See also Hans,
et al., supra note 108, at 94 (observing that "if the goal is to drive change in firm behavior" for social
ends, an ESG standard setting process requires "a broader democratic legitimization than what financial
reporting standard setting usually has; it needs to be more akin to what we require for other major
regulatory interventions (e.g., taxes or emission limits)").
11 1. Cf Mark J. Roe & Roy Shapira, The Power of the Narrative in CorporateLawmaking (Harv.
L. Sch., working Paper No. 20-21, 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract=3703882 [https://perma.cc/42MTYDSL] (questioning the politically popular narrative that corporate short-termism is a pervasive
problem).
112. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J.
CORP. L. 33, 43 n.33 (2006) (observing that "[f]or thirty-odd years, corporate scholars have debated
whether corporate charter competition benefits investors or only self-serving firm managers," and citing
the seminal works addressing whether there is a "race-to-the-top" or "race-to-the-bottom" in American
corporate law).
113. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36-39 (1991) (tracing the history of this vigorous
debate); see also Rock, supra note 4 (discussing the debate in current times).
114. For a recent overview of the debate between those who favor board primacy and those who
favor shareholder primacy, as well as references to leading works, see Simone M. Sepe, Board and
ShareholderPower, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REv. 1377, 1386-91 (2017).
115. Since 2018, listed companies in the EU have been required to include information in their
annual reports on the topics of environmental protection, social responsibility and treatment of
employees, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery, and diversity on company boards (in
terms of age, gender, educational, and professional background). See Non-Financial Reporting, EUR.
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policy embrace of the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals.,16
Moreover, they were promulgated pursuant to a call by the European
Parliament to create disclosure requirements that
take account of the multidimensional nature of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and the diversity of the CSR policies
implemented by businesses matched by a sufficient level of
comparability to meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders
as well as the need to provide consumers with easy access to
information on the impact of businesses on society."'
The SEC would be acting, by contrast, without predicate acts by political
bodies endorsing the substantive ends sought.'18
Notably, the EU has not yet chosen to mandate any particular ESG
reporting framework, instead issuing non-mandatory guidelines on how to
present the required information while giving companies the option to
instead use "international, European or national guidelines according to
their own characteristics or business environment."1 9 The inability of the
EU, which has been actively considering sustainability issues for many
years, to settle on a single disclosure framework highlights the difficulties
the SEC will confront should it move forward with the pending requests.
Placing responsibility for developing an ESG disclosure framework on
the SEC also raises questions about resource allocation. If the SEC
mandates disclosure on a topic, it assumes a responsibility for ensuring
compliance, either through its screening of SEC filings or through
enforcement. Proponents view this as a benefit, given that it promises to
COMM'N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/companyreporting/non-financial-reporting en [https://perma.cc/QJ8M-RTMH].
116. Communication from the Commission on Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting

(Methodology for Reporting Non-Financial Information), 2017
117.

0.J. (C 215)

1, 2 (EU).

Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014

Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 1.
118. See Harper Ho, supra note 103, at 9 (observing that "the institutional foundations of emerging
non-financial reporting and sustainability-oriented policies outside the U.S. include an emphasis on
stakeholder interests, a comfort with the government's guiding role in the economy, and a far greater
reliance on flexible principles-based disclosure approaches and on regulatory enforcement rather than
on prescriptive rules and enforcement through shareholder litigation," and that "all of these stand in stark
contrast to the norms and practices that shape the perspectives of U.S. regulators, legislators, and
reporting companies themselves").
119. EUR. COMM'N, supra note 115. But see EFRAG Mandated to Provide Recommendations on
PossibleEuropeanNon-FinancialReporting Standards,EUR. FIN. REPORTING ADVISORY GRP. (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.efrag.org/News/Public-243/EFRAG-mandated-to-provide-recommendations-on-po
ssible-European-Non-Financial-Reporting-Standards [https://perma.cc/8EC4-RRUN] (reporting that
the European Commission has mandated EFRAG to undertake preparatory work for the elaboration of
possible EU non-financial reporting standards).
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'

promote the integrity and completeness of companies' ESG disclosures,
combatting the problem of "greenwashing" that many believe is prevalent
today.1 20 But unless the SEC's budget is increased, this will necessarily
divert resources from other SEC priorities. That diversion may be
warranted, but it is a cost that must be explicitly weighed in the
discussion.' 2
Placing ESG disclosures in SEC filings also heightens the private
liability risk faced by companies and directors and officers. This is perhaps
the biggest elephant in the room. While ESG disclosures in stand-alone
sustainability reports can theoretically give rise to private securities fraud
liability, mandating that such disclosures be included in SEC filings
heightens that risk considerably. First, stand-alone sustainability reports are
not subject to the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act that operate to heighten the liability exposure of CEOs and CFOs. 22
Disclosures in stand-alone sustainability reports also avoid exposure to
Section 11 liability and to Rule 14a-9 liability, because Section 11 applies
only to misrepresentations and omissions in a company's registration
statement filed with the SEC in connection with a public offering 2 3 and
Rule 14a-9 applies only to misrepresentations and omissions in a company's
proxy solicitation materials. 124 Such disclosures are also less exposed to
litigation under Rule 1Ob-5.125 This is because sustainability reports have
multiple audiences, so it remains open to a company to argue that a topic
covered in such a report was not material within the meaning of the
securities laws and did not affect its stock price. Companies also have
freedom to couch statements in sustainability reports in aspirational or
vague terms, which can help to reduce liability risk.1 2 6 Indeed, some law
firms recommend that companies phrase ESG disclosures in these terms for

120. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 963 (arguing that sustainability disclosures should be included
within securities filings in part because it "would subject issuers' sustainability disclosures to SEC
oversight and enforcement and clarify that fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions are actionable
as securities fraud").
121. See Sommer, supra note 102, at 20 (warning that "[t]he hasty expansion of materiality
concepts [to encompass matters of social concern] may well result in a strain on the resources of the
Commission that will impair seriously its ability to do that which it has classically done so well police
the disclosure system and the securities markets").

C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14.
U.S.C. § 77k.
C.F.R.§ 240.14a-9.
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.

122.
123.
124.
125.

17
15
17
17

126.

See Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Issues in the Spotlight: The Increasing Need to Improve

Publicly-Held Companies' CSR and ESG Disclosures, 33 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 33), https://ssm.com/abstract=3615327 [https://perma.cc/4EHK-23Q2] (observing that
"generalized statements about a company's commitment to ethical conduct likely will be considered
aspirational and hence not materially misleading").

1848

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1821

precisely this reason.' 27 SEC-mandated disclosure would likely reduce this
flexibility. As a consequence of the foregoing, it would be more difficult for
a company to argue against the materiality of ESG information, at least in a
manner that might support a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the House bill would
render ESG disclosures "defacto" material. 12 8
Some may perceive this as a benefit. 12 9 But others would view it as a
major cost. The debate over the social value of "fraud-on-the-market"
securities-fraud class actions is long-standing and passionate.130 Fraud-onthe-market class actions threaten to impose massive damages on defendants
and thus may have settlement value out of proportion to their merits,
inviting strike suit litigation that taxes companies-and ultimately
shareholders-and threatens to affect corporate disclosure practices in
socially undesirable ways.13 1 Concerns over strike suit litigation led to the
adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995,
which makes it more difficult for a securities-fraud class action to get past
a motion to dismiss. 13 2 Most importantly, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to
plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter and
imposes a discovery stay until after a motion to dismiss has been decided.1 33
It also contains a safe harbor for forward-looking statements accompanied
by meaningful cautionary language or made without actual knowledge of
their falsity. 3 4 The predictable form lawsuits related to ESG disclosures

127. See, e.g., SOC'Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, LEGAL
RISKS AND ESG DISCLOSURES: WHAT CORPORATE SECRETARIES SHOULD KNOW 16-17 (2018), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ising-Garbow-Meltzer-McPhee-White-Assaf-Leg
al-Risks-and-ESG-Disclosures-What-Corporate-Secretaries-Should-Know.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6CSA4G]; JONES DAY, MANAGING LEGAL RISKS FOR ESG DISCLOSURES UNDER U.S. LAW 3 (2019), https
[https://per
://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/07/managing-legal-risks-for-esg-disclosures-us-law
ma.cc/8B9Z-GT6D]. This suggests that another potential way to achieve more robust ESG disclosure is
to insulate such disclosures from liability exposure rather than heightening such exposure. Cf Hazen,
supra note 126, at 36-40 (suggesting that the SEC adopt a liability safe harbor rule to encourage ESG
disclosures).
128.

See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong.

§ 2(b)(3)

(2020).

129. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 98, at 965 (taking the position that, when it comes to policing
SEC-mandated ESG disclosures, "private enforcement is likely to serve as a valuable supplement to
public enforcement").

130. For an overview of the debate, see Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison d'Etre of the
Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION 39 (Sean Griffith, Jessica Erickson, David H. Webber & verity Winship, eds., 2018).
131.

See id; see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring

the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule J0b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301,
1326-49 (2008) (exploring why private enforcement of Rule 1 Ob-5 may lead to overenforcement and
how it can complicate efforts to approximate optimal deterrence).

132.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).

133.
134.

15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-4(b).
§ 78u-5.
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will take are of a sort, however, that are often immune from the PSLRA's
protections against abusive litigation.
Imagine a company that has an industrial accident, or finds itself
embroiled in a sexual harassment scandal, or experiences a cybersecurity
breach. These are events that even the most prudently managed corporation
cannot completely protect against, at least not at acceptable cost. They are
also events that, when made public, can result in a meaningful stock-price
decline. Imagine also that the company has in the past made representations
in its SEC filings that speak to the company's management of workplace
safety, human relations, or cybersecurity risks, as the case may be. Imagine
further that a Rule lOb-5 class action is filed alleging that the relevant
disclosures were misleading half-truths that helped the company maintain
an artificially inflated stock price, because the company did not disclose
facts available to the board which, at least in hindsight, appear to have
suggested the unfortunate event was likely to occur or that the risk
management strategies the company was undertaking were inadequate.
Cases like this-commonly referred to as "event-driven" securities
litigation-have increased in prevalence in recent years, 135 and SEC135.

See Kevin LaCroix, First, Wildfires. Then What? Securities Litigation, of Course, D&O

DIARY (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/1 I/articles/securities-litigation/first-wildfir
es-securities-litigation-course/ [https://perma.cc/G8FD-334W] (explaining that fewer financial frauds
have led to more event-driven securities class actions, where "the plaintiffs seek to rely on problems the
defendant companies have experienced in their operations that caused their share price to drop," and that
the rise in these suits is "one of the significant factors explaining why the number of securities lawsuits

filings is so high above historical norms"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation in 2017: "It Was
the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times ", COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/03/19/securities-litigation-in-2017-it-was-the-best-of-times-it-was-t
he-worst-of-times/ [https://perma.cc/FEV9-7LVN] (describing the "new trend" of "event-driven" class
actions, where an adverse event like "an explosion, a crash, a mass torts episode (such as a toxic drug
with a side effect)" will trigger a securities class action alleging that "investors were injured by the
defendant company's failure to disclose its misconduct or negligence"); ELISA MENDOZA & JEFFREY
LUBITZ, ISS SEC. CLASS ACTION SERVS., EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE NEW DRIVER
IN CLASS ACTION GROWTH (2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/]SS-SCAS-Event
-Driven-Securities-Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GUN-43XY] (documenting the rise in event-driven
securities class actions and discussing examples of recent cases); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, A RISING THREAT: THE NEW CLASS ACTION RACKET THAT HARMS INVESTORS AND THE
ECONOMY 12 (2018), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/l 0/ARisingThrea
tResearch_Paper-webI.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8R6-TNEN] [hereinafter RISING THREAT] (explaining
that event-driven securities class actions "typically contend that the defendant company's statements
before the adverse event occurred misrepresented the risk that an oil platform would explode, that its
products would be the subject of tort litigation, or that its systems containing employee or customer
information would be hacked" or, alternatively, "that the company was obligated to disclose the risk of
the adverse event and failed to do so"); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONTAINING THE
CONTAGION: PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE BROKEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM (2019), https://i
nstituteforlegalreform.com/research/containing-the-contagion-proposals-to-reform-the-broken-securiti
es-class-action-system/ [https://perma.cc/9KMG-8MN7] (arguing that the number of event-driven
securities class actions continues to rise and offering regulatory and legislative solutions that the SEC
and Congress could adopt to address the perceived problem).
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mandated ESG disclosure would only accelerate this trend. Event-driven
securities class actions can be difficult to get dismissed on the pleadings,
even when of dubious merit.1 36 Although it may be highly doubtful that the
alleged omissions were material to investors or that the defendant
corporation acted with the requisite scienter, courts may (and often do)
allow cases like this to proceed past a motion to dismiss.1 37 Unless the
statement alleged to be misleading was so vague as to be considered puffery,
questions of materiality are often treated by courts as raising factual
questions inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. And whereas
the PLSRA's heightened scienter pleading requirement creates a real barrier
to frivolous claims alleging that defendants knew, or were reckless in not
knowing, the falsity of an affirmative misstatement, scienter may not be
rigorously examined in half-truth cases. This is because scienter will turn
on whether the defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that a
reasonable investor would have viewed the challenged statement as
misleading in light of the omission of some allegedly material fact. Whether
a statement is misleading, and whether an omitted fact is material, turns on
the perspective of a "reasonable investor," raising factual questions that
courts may be reluctant to examine on a motion to dismiss. 13 8

136. See MENDOZA & LUBITz, supranote 135, at 5 (the arguments made in event-driven litigation,
"even if tenuous, do survive motions to dismiss"); JEFFREY A. DAILEY & NEAL ROSS MARDER, WILLIS
TOWERS WATSON, THE RISE IN EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES LITIGATION: WHY IT MATTERS TO
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 2 (2018), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/99361/aokuj/the-rise-in-event(explaining that
[https://perma.cc/2GAP-D4G9]
driven-securities-litigation-why-it-matters-to.pdf
despite their weakness, "not all [event-driven] cases are dismissed, and even those that are dismissed
come with significant cost and disruption to a company"); Emily Strauss, Is Everything Securities
Fraud?,UNIV. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-16), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=3664132 [https://perma.cc/9ZFX-8G6E] (reporting regression results of empirical
study indicating that securities class actions arising from misconduct where the most direct victims are
not shareholders have significantly lower dismissal rates than cases where the primary victims are
shareholders).

137.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Changing Characterof Securities Litigationin 2019: Why It's

Time to Draw Some Distinctions, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), https://clsbluesky.la
w.columbia.edu/2019/01/22/the-changing-character-of-securities-litigation-in-2019-why-its-time-to-dr
aw-some-distinctions/ [https://perma.cc/7PA5-QB66] (explaining that "[w]hen the risk seemed remote
at the time the corporate issuer made its disclosures, both the materiality of the issuer's omission and its
alleged scienter would seem open to serious challenge," but that although "many cases should and will
be dismissed, this category of cases may remain viable"); Strauss, supra note 136; see also id. at 22
("Many of the catastrophes that result in [event-driven] lawsuits may truly be black swan events, such
that the risk that they might occur was so slight as to be immaterial, and thus disclosure of the risk was
not required under the securities laws. Alternatively, even if the risk ultimately was material, managers
may not have perceived it to be so, and therefore did not disclose the risk not because they thought they
had anything to hide, but because they honestly and un-recklessly misjudged the likelihood that the
disaster would occur. Under lOb-5, this constitutes mistake, rather than fraud, because the managers
lacked scienter. In both of these situations, the fact of the underlying disaster opens the door to hindsight
bias, potentially increasing pressure on defendants to settle.").

138.

See Rose, supra note 61, at 101.
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It can also be difficult to defeat class certification in event-driven
litigation. To overcome individualized issues of reliance that would
otherwise preclude class certification, plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 class actions
typically invoke the so-called "fraud-on-the-market" (FOTM) presumption
of reliance first recognized by the Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson.' 39
The FOTM presumption proceeds from the notion that investors who did
not actually read corporate disclosures nevertheless indirectly relied on
them if the misrepresentation impacted the price that they paid for their
securities. To invoke the presumption a plaintiff must prove that: the alleged
misrepresentations were publicly known; the stock traded in an efficient
market; and the plaintiff traded the stock between when the
misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed. 14 0 Plaintiffs
must also plead-but need not prove until trial-that the misrepresentations
were material.141 As the Supreme Court has explained:
Each of these requirements follows from the fraud-on-the-market
theory underlying the presumption. If the misrepresentation was not
publicly known, then it could not have distorted the stock's market
price. So too if the misrepresentation was immaterial-that is, if it
would not have "been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available"or if the market in which the stock traded was inefficient. And if the
plaintiff did not buy or sell the stock after the misrepresentation was
made but before the truth was revealed, then he could not be said to
42
have acted in reliance on a fraud-tainted price.1
The Supreme Court has held that even though defendants cannot rebut the
presumption at class certification by arguing that the misstatement was
immaterial (an issue that must await resolution until summary judgment or
trial), defendants are entitled to present evidence of a lack of "price impact"
to do so-viz., evidence that the asserted misrepresentation (or its
correction) did not in fact affect the market price of the defendant's stock.1 4 3
In traditional securities fraud cases alleging, for example, misrepresented
financial results, defendants attempt to rebut price impact by presenting an
event study showing either the lack of a statistically significant abnormal
stock price increase at the time the challenged statement was made or the
139. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Supreme Court recently was asked to
overturn its holding in Basic but declined. See HalliburtonCo. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S.

258 (2014).
140. Halliburton,573 U.S. at 277-78.
141. Id. at 278.
142. Id. at 278 (quoting Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32).
143. Id. at 283.
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lack of a statistically significant abnormal stock price decline on the date
that the falsity of the alleged misstatement was revealed (the so-called
"corrective date"). In event-driven litigation, however, both routes are
typically unavailing. As to the former, plaintiff's theory is not that the
misleading statement inflated the stock price at the time it was made, but
that it operated to maintain the company's already inflated stock price. As
to the latter, the "corrective date" will be the date on which a negative event
occurred triggering a meaningful stock price decline-while all or most of
that drop will reflect a "materialization of the risk and not the amount by
which the price was previously inflated because the market was fooled into
believing the risk was lower than it really was," that is not something that
an event study can easily establish.14 4
An alternative potential way to establish a lack of price impact would be
to argue that the statements at issue were too generic to have had any impact
on the stock price. The Second Circuit recently held, however, that this is
impermissible, reasoning that allowing this type of evidence would
effectively permit a defendant to smuggle in evidence on materiality at class
certification that should await consideration until summary judgment or
trial. 145 The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Second Circuit's
decision; in its cert petition the defendant argued that review was warranted
in part because under the Second Circuit's reasoning "[t]he ease with which
inflation-maintenance plaintiffs will be able to obtain class certification will
the troubling practice of 'event-driven securities
further incentivize
46
litigation."'1
The difficulties associated with terminating event-driven securities
litigation at the motion to dismiss or class certification stage, coupled with
the costs of discovery and extremely large potential damage awards typical
in this sort of litigation, 147 means that the risk of vexatious litigation is
144. Merritt B. Fox & Joshua Mitts, Calamity: The Hazards of Event-Driven Securities Litigation
4 (August 28, 2020) (manuscript on file with author); see also RISING THREAT, supra note 135, at 14
(explaining that the "'event' invariably causes a very large drop in the company's stock price," and that
while "all or most of that drop will be attributable to the adverse event itself, and the consequences for
the company's future profitability," the "securities class action complaint will assert that the price drop
resulted from the supposed 'correction' of prior false statements or material omissions" and "that the
potential damages in the securities case are tied to that very large price drop, which the plaintiffs' lawyers
will use to argue for a large settlement, if the case proceeds past the motion to dismiss").

145. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 268 (2d. Cir. 2020), cert.
grantedsub nom., Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 2020 WL 7296815 (U.S. Dec. 11,
2020) (No. 20-222).
146.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 2020 WL

5040492, at *26 (No. 20-222).
147. Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures:SecuritiesFraudLiability in the Shadow
of a CorporateCatastrophe,107 GEO. L.J. 967, 971 (2019) (observing that "there is a feverish effort by
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high. 148 This has led many to voice concerns about event-driven
litigation.' 4 9 These critics include not just groups like the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform that have a vested interest in reducing corporate
liability exposure,0 but also respected scholars15 1 and even shareholderoriented groups like Institutional Shareholder Services. 152 Any serious
the plaintiffs' lawyers to maximize the size of the class-and the resulting recovery-by identifying as
many false or misleading statements tied to the disaster, as far back in time as possible").
148. Strauss, supra note 136, at 18 (arguing that "[t]he pressure to settle even claims with a low
probability of success is compounded in event-driven cases for several reasons," including that: (1) "such
firms are typically fighting battles on multiple fronts" and "might not have the resources to devote to
battling out a shareholder lawsuit of even unclear merit, particularly when doing so will likely keep the
initial misconduct in the news cycle and the stock price depressed"; and (2) "the application of l0b-5
jurisprudence in event-driven securities cases has been inconsistent, leading to great uncertainty for
defendants"). Proponents of mandatory ESG-disclosure have downplayed the associated private liability
risk by pointing out that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that they suffered a loss as a result of a
misleading half-truth, see, e.g., Fisch, supranote 98, at 965, but plaintiffs' burden to prove loss causation
does little to mitigate the risk of vexatious litigation. Loss causation is an issue that generally cannot be
resolved prior to the completion of discovery: it can be averred generally in the complaint, and the
Supreme Court has held that defendants cannot present evidence of a lack of loss causation in opposition
to class certification. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011).
149. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Scrutinizing Event-Driven SecuritiesLitigation, D&O DIARY (Mar.
27, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litigation/scrutinizing-event-drivensecurities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/XQM8-TLU3] ("I have been sounding the alarm on event-driven
cases for some time now. While on the one hand, these cases often lack merit (for example, they are
often fatally deficient on scienter or causation allegations), on the other hand, their sheer volume means
cost and vexation for companies and their insurers. The fact is that in the ebb and flow off [sic] day to
day business, many companies face setbacks or hit unexpected operational hurdles. It is bad enough that
these companies must deal with the adverse circumstances; increasingly they must also deal with a
resulting securities lawsuit as well."); JEFFREY A. DAILEY & NEAL Ross MARDER, supra note 136, at 1
("The inherent problem in all event-driven securities litigation is that just because something bad
happened does not mean that the company or its directors and officers committed fraud. Because many
of these events relate to business or operational risks that are known or already subject to a company's
risk disclosures, many of the event-driven suits are based on the tenuous theory that the occurrence or
the event upon which the case is based was the materialization of an under-disclosed or downplayed

risk.").
150. RISING THREAT, supra note 135, at 2 (arguing that these cases "are powerful weapons for
extorting settlements, regardless of the merits, due to the cost of defending the case in court and the
reputational harm to the defendant company were the underlying event to appear in the headlines"); cf
Julie G. Reiser & Steven J. Toll, Event-Driven Litigation Defense, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 23, 2019), https:/corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/23/event-driven-litigation-def
ense/ [https://perma.cc/4U9B-L8ND] (reacting to the Chamber's position and arguing that "event-driven
cases serve as a deterrent to companies who might otherwise conceal or misrepresent their operations
because they recognize that investors will hold them accountable for doing so").
151. Coffee, Jr., supra note 135 (observing that the "trend in 'event-driven' litigation appears to
be to file early, soon after the stock drop, and without the more elaborate investigation that the larger
established plaintiff's firms today employ in securities litigation [focused on more traditional financial
frauds]"); Fox & Mitts, supra note 144, at 2 ("[T]oo many event-driven suits have survived past the
motion to dismiss stage when the allegations in their complaints should have been found insufficient
with respect to either loss causation or materiality.").
152. MENDOZA & LUBITZ, supranote 135, at 2 ("[T]he new trend of event-driven securities class
action litigation is on the rise and resulting in more and more recoveries for shareholders, despite more
tenuous arguments being the basis of the lawsuits."); id. at 4 (observing that "[e]vent-driven suits are
based on a more tenuous argument than core accounting" cases).
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discussion regarding the adoption of a broad SEC-mandated ESG disclosure
regime cannot ignore these concerns.
It should also be recognized that investors have alternative tools at their
disposal to achieve greater consistency and credibility in corporate ESG
disclosures, raising the question of why a mandatory regulatory solution
should be favored over a market-based solution. Investors can submit
precatory proposals under Rule 14a-8 requesting greater board involvement
in ESG disclosure practices or ESG risk oversight, for example. 153 If
investors can reach a consensus on which ESG disclosure framework they
prefer, they can also use Rule 14a-8 or informal engagement to promote its
use. They could use similar techniques to encourage integrated ESG
reporting in SEC filings, if they view that as independently important.
It appears that these techniques are already bearing considerable fruit.
During the 2019 proxy season, Glass Lewis found that "approximately 43%
of Russell 1000 companies had established some sort of board oversight of
ESG issues."154 Moreover, in Larry Fink's 2020 letter to CEOs he asked the
companies Blackrock invests in to: (1) publish a disclosure in line with
industry-specific SASB guidelines by year-end, or disclose a similar set of
data in a way that is relevant to the particular business; and (2) disclose
climate-related risks in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).1"5 Other leading asset
managers, such as State Street and Vanguard, have similarly called on
153.

17 C.F.R.

§ 240.14a-8.

SEC Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders of publicly held companies to

require management to include shareholder-sponsored proposals in management's proxy statement if
certain procedural requirements are met and the substance of the proposal does not fall within one of
several enumerated bases for exclusion. See Harwell Wells, "CorporationLaw Is Dead": Heroic
Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of CorporationLaw at the Height of the American

Century, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 305, 340 (2013) ("SEC Rule

14a-8

...

was first adopted in 1942, in what

could be seen as a late burst of New Deal enthusiasm for grassroots (shareholder) democracy; the
requirement is still sometimes referred to as the 'Town Hall rule."'). In recent years, "shareholders have
enjoyed considerable success under the [] rule in requiring management to include shareholder proposals

relating to social issues." Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social
Responsibilityand CorporatePurpose, 62 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 37), https://p
apers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3542833 [https://perma.cc/XF9R-CC6T]; see also id. at 37
nn.220-22 (citing examples of instances where the SEC staff has refused to allow management to
exclude shareholder proposals "relating to sustainability, climate change, and ESG"); cf. Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule J4a-8's Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder
Micromanagementby Proposal,85 FORDHAM L. REv. 705 (2016) (critiquing this trend). While the SEC
recently tightened the ownership requirements for submitting shareholder proposals and heightened the
level of shareholder support a proposal must receive to be eligible for resubmission, it did not broaden
the substantive bases upon which management can exclude shareholder proposals. See Press Release,
SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.

sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-220 [https://perma.cc/S5YR-8U97].
154. Proxy Talk: How CorporateBoards Can Oversee ESG Issues, GLASS LEWIS (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.glasslewis.com/proxy-talk-how-corporate-boards-can-oversee-esg-issues/

c/W7WF-BG9M].
155. Fink, supra note 2.

[https://perma.c
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companies to align their ESG disclosures with the SASB standards and
TCFD recommendations. 156 Moreover, calls for greater consistency and
comparability in ESG disclosures have led major standard setters to begin
efforts at harmonization.1 57 While the proposals seeking an SEC-mandated
ESG disclosure framework have emphasized the failure of market forces
over the past several decades to produce "consistent, comparable, highlyreliable ESG information," they may have spoken too soon.' 58
A final point is in order. The concerns raised thus far are likely to
resonate most strongly with those who possess a free-market orientation.
But progressive scholars have also warned against the tendency to try to
156. See, e.g., RON O'HANLEY, STATE ST., THE ESG OPPORTUNITY FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS:
FIVE QUESTIONS FOR ESG BOARD OVERSIGHT 8 (2021), https://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/state
street/documents/Articles/ron-ohanley-esg-opportunity-for-corporate-directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/V
T78-7CXZ] ("State Street, like other large investors, has endorsed SASB and TFCD as two marketdriven frameworks that ask companies to provide decision-useful information in a consistent way").
Companies appear to be listening. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink's 2021 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK
(2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/
KZ63-CBDK] ("We are greatly encouraged by the progress we have seen over the past year - a 363%
increase in SASB disclosures and more than 1,700 organizations expressing support for the TCFD.").
While the influence of asset managers weakens the case for SEC-mandated ESG disclosure, it raises
controversies of its own. See supra note 12; see also Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate
Conformism (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 568, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/so
13/papers.cfmabstractid=3793035 (arguing that investor-induced corporate conformism on contested
moral issues undermines pluralistic values). An examination of these controversies falls outside the
scope of this Article.
157. See SASB & Other ESG Frameworks: The Sustainability Reporting Ecosystem,
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/about/sasb-and-other-esg-frameworks/
[https://perma.cc/8TZ5-5K3X] (reporting that in "September 2020, five leading framework and
standard-setting organizations--CDP, CDSB, GRI, IIRC and SASB-announced a shared vision for a
comprehensive corporate reporting system that includes both financial accounting and sustainability
disclosure, connected via integrated reporting," and that in "response to global market demands for
convergence, in November 2020 the IIRC and SASB announced their intention to merge into a unified
organization, the Value Reporting Foundation"); see also Press Release, Int'l Integrated Reporting
Council, IIRC and SASB Announce Intent to Merge in Major Step Towards Simplifying the Corporate
Reporting System (Nov. 25, 2020), https://integratedreporting.org/news/iirc-and-sasb-announce-intentto-merge-in-major-step-towards-simplifying-the-corporate-reporting-system/ [https://perma.cc/4524-X
3RB]; IMPACT MGMT. PROJECT, WORLD ECON. F. & DELOITTE, STATEMENT OF INTENT TO WORK
TOGETHER TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE CORPORATE REPORTING (2020), https://29kjwb3armds2g3gi4lq
2sx I -wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Statement-of-Intent-to-Work-Together-Towards-C
Acct.
Sustainability
[https://perma.cc/Z3UQ-EXRK];
omprehensive-Corporate-Reporting.pdf
Standards Bd., Promoting Clarity and Compatibility in the Sustainability Landscape: GRI and SASB
Announce Collaboration (July 12, 2020), https://www.sasb.org/blog/gri-and-sasb-announce-collaborati
on-sustainability-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/H3HT-5KVB]; Oliver Cann, Measuring Stakeholder

Capitalism: World's Largest Companies Support Developing Core Set of Universal ESG Disclosures,
WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/press/2020/01/measuring-stakeholder-capit
alism-world-s-largest-companies-support-developing-core-set-of-universal-esg-disclosures [https://per

ma.cc/CN9E-3RLS].
158.

Request for Rulemaking from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, supra note 35, at 12; see

also Virginia Harper Ho, NonfinancialRisk Disclosureand the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS.
L.J. 407, 431-56 (2018) (arguing that private ordering is insufficient to address investors' need for ESGrelated information).
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expand the scope of the federal securities laws in service of non-financial
interests. In a recent article, Professor Ann Lipton warns of the "detrimental
effects of relying on investor-oriented disclosure to serve the needs of the
general public." 1 59 She argues that funneling demands for ESG disclosure
through the SEC encourages advocates for information disclosure geared
toward stakeholder audiences to conceal their true motives and that this
prevarication comes at real cost, as the "need to emphasize financial risk
and shareholder return inhibits a fuller discussion of the societal need for
such information" and risks "contributing to a discourse that suggests that
investors are the only members of society who matter." 160 She also points
out that SEC-mandated ESG disclosure would fail to reach a growing
number of large and socially impactful private companies, not subject to
SEC-imposed disclosure obligations. 161 A better approach, in Lipton's
view, is to push for a generalized disclosure system designed for stakeholder
as opposed to investor interests. 162
CONCLUSION

Henry Kissinger is credited with coining the idea of "constructive
ambiguity" as a negotiating tactic, one that employs the deliberate use of
ambiguous language on sensitives topics to advance some political purpose.
But ambiguity can be destructive as well, particularly if the end sought is
sound public policy. Whether the SEC ought to mandate "ESG" disclosure,
and if so, how, can be approached and debated on a discrete, topic by topic
basis, like any other item of arguably material information. If the call instead
is for the SEC to adopt a broad ESG disclosure framework modeled on
frameworks designed to meet the informational needs of stakeholderinclusive audiences, then the significance of the request should be
recognized and the difficult questions it raises openly addressed.
159.

Lipton, supranote 63, at 504.

160. Id at 555, 560.
161.

See id at 519-26.

162. Id. See also David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 379, 383, 410 (2005) (advocating
for the use of "informational regulations," defined as "government mandated public disclosure of
information on the environmental performance of regulated entities," to supplement command-andcontrol environmental regulatory strategies, but observing that "the SEC is not the appropriate agency,
nor federal securities law the appropriate vehicle, to develop a comprehensive informational regulatory
approach to environmental protection based on a paradigm of formal corporate environmental
reporting"); cf Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10, at 58-66 (arguing that taking a stakeholder view of
corporate governance could harm society by insulating corporate leaders and impeding policy reforms
that would offer stakeholders greater protection); Matteo Gatti & Chrystin Ondersma, Can A Broader
CorporatePurpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 IowA J. CORP. L. 1
(2020) (arguing that stakeholderism will hurt not help the intended beneficiaries).

